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NULLIFYING THE DEBT CEILING THREAT ONCE AND 
FOR ALL: WHY THE PRESIDENT SHOULD EMBRACE 
THE LEAST UNCONSTITUTIONAL OPTION 
Neil H. Buchanan* & Michael C. Dorf** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In August 2011, Congress and the President narrowly averted economic 
and political catastrophe, agreeing at the last possible moment to authorize a 
series of increases in the national debt ceiling.1 This respite, unfortunately, was 
merely temporary. The amounts of the increases in the debt ceiling that 
Congress authorized in 2011 were only sufficient to accommodate the 
additional borrowing that would be necessary through the end of 2012. In an 
economy that continued to show chronic weakness—weakness that continues 
to this day—the federal government would predictably continue to collect 
lower-than-normal tax revenues and to make higher-than-normal expenditures, 
which meant that the debt would necessarily grow over time. Because there is 
no reason to believe that the annual budget will be balanced after 2012—
indeed, because that would be an affirmatively bad idea, even if the economy 
were to return to full employment2—everyone knew that the debt ceiling 
would have to be raised by the beginning of 2013, to accommodate economic 
reality as the country continues to try to return to prosperity. 
As soon as the agreement temporarily averting the crisis was reached in 
2011, however, the two top Republican leaders in Congress announced that 
they planned to demand additional spending cuts every time in the future that 
the debt ceiling needed to be increased.3 Their strategy appears to be based on 
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1. See Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, § 301, 125 Stat. 240, 251–55 
(delegating to president power to raise debt ceiling pursuant to complicated procedure whereby 
members of Congress do not directly vote for debt ceiling increase). 
2. See Neil H. Buchanan, Good Deficits:  Protecting the Public Interest from Deficit 
Hysteria, 31 Va. Tax Rev. 75, 105–15 (2011) (articulating benefits of deficit spending, even in 
good economic times). 
3. See 157 Cong. Rec. S5219 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 2011) (statement of Sen. Mitch McConnell) 
(“[N]ever again will any President, from either party, be allowed to raise the debt ceiling . . . 
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the assumption that reaching the debt ceiling would, as a matter of course, 
require the president to cut spending in order to keep total borrowing under the 
statutory limit. If that were a correct reading of the Constitution, the president 
would in each case be forced to choose between inflicting severe and 
immediate austerity on the country at the moment the ceiling was reached—
making spending cuts adequate to reduce total spending, so that it would match 
the tax revenues flowing into the Treasury—and accepting less severe austerity 
in the immediate term, by agreeing to cut spending by larger amounts in the 
future as the “price” of allowing borrowing to rise in the immediate term, with 
concomitantly smaller spending cuts up front. We addressed the debt ceiling 
standoff in an article published in the Columbia Law Review earlier this year:  
How to Choose the Least Unconstitutional Option: Lessons for the President 
(and Others) from the Debt Ceiling Standoff4 (hereinafter “How to Choose”). 
We argued there that it is incorrect to assume that the president can, or should, 
reduce authorized spending if the federal government reaches its statutory debt 
ceiling. Instead, we argued that the president should faithfully carry out the 
exact levels of spending and taxes that are required by the duly enacted budget 
of the United States—even if doing so requires him to exceed the debt 
ceiling—by issuing Treasury bonds in amounts sufficient to finance the 
difference between the levels of spending and taxation that Congress has 
authorized. 
As this follow-up essay is being published, in late December 2012, the 
President and congressional Republicans are in the midst of budget 
negotiations that may hinge on whether our argument was correct—that the 
president has a duty under the Constitution to set aside the debt ceiling, if the 
moment of truth comes. Unfortunately, none of the participants in the 
negotiations has offered any public indication that they even understand the 
nature of the problem that the president would face, much less how to resolve 
that problem, should Congress refuse to raise the debt ceiling. 
We argue here that the President should make it clear, as soon as possible, 
that the debt ceiling is not, and cannot legally be used as, a cudgel with which 
Congress can force him to renegotiate the federal budget. If the President does 
not do so now, the problem will continue to arise in the future, every time the 
debt level grows (as it should, in a growing economy which offers continuing 
opportunities for public investment) above the arbitrary dollar limit that 
Congress might set. Therefore, the President’s best course is to make clear that 
the debt ceiling must always give way to the wishes of Congress, as expressed 
through the budget of the United States. 
 
without having to engage in the kind of debate we have just come through.”); Jonathan Weisman, 
G.O.P. Pledges New Standoff on Debt Limit, N.Y. Times, May 16, 2012, at A1 (reporting House 
Speaker John A. Boehner’s vow “to hold up another increase in the federal debt ceiling unless it 
was offset by larger spending cuts”). 
4. Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, How to Choose the Least Unconstitutional Option:  
Lessons for the President (and Others) from the Debt Ceiling Standoff, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1175 
(2012). 
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II. THE DEBT CEILING, THE “TRILEMMA,” AND ANOTHER UNNECESSARY 
AND HARMFUL POLITICAL CRISIS 
As part of the agreement that averted a default on government obligations 
in mid-2011, both sides agreed to a provision suggested by Senate Minority 
Leader Mitch McConnell, under which the President was authorized to propose 
increases in the debt ceiling, and Congress would then have the ability (with a 
supermajority vote) to overrule the President’s decision.5 President Obama did, 
indeed, propose such increases, which took effect when Congress failed to 
block them.6 
As another political crisis began to come to a boil in late 2012, the 
President suggested that the parties agree to make the McConnell approach the 
permanent method for dealing with the debt ceiling, allowing the President to 
increase the debt ceiling with congressional authorization ex post, thus making 
it possible for the President to execute the budget of the United States.7 In 
response, Senator McConnell said of the President, on the floor of the Senate:  
“[N]ow the President is asking for unlimited—unlimited—authority to borrow 
whenever he wants to for whatever amount he wants.”8 
That is either a misunderstanding or a mischaracterization of what is at 
issue in this debate. As we discussed in How to Choose, when the debt ceiling 
limits the president’s ability to issue debt sufficient to make up the difference 
between the funds on hand and appropriated expenditures, it presents the 
president with what we called a “trilemma”9: faced with the constitutional duty 
to execute the spending laws that Congress enacted, to collect tax revenues 
under the laws that Congress enacted, and to borrow no more than the amount 
of gross debt specified in the debt ceiling statute, the president would have to 
violate at least one of those laws when the debt ceiling is reached. In thus 
violating his oath to faithfully execute the laws—all of the laws—of the United 
States, he would be acting unconstitutionally. The only question was which 
unconstitutional choice would be least unconstitutional. 
 
5. See supra note 1. 
6. See H.R.J. Res. 98, 112th Cong. (2012) (as rejected by Senate, Jan. 26, 2012) 
(disapproving President’s debt limit increase); Robert Pear, Senate Vote Approves Rise of $1.2 
Trillion in Debt Limit, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 2012, at A12 (reporting Senate’s approval of increase 
as evidenced by its rejection of H.R.J. Res. 98).  
7. Treasury Secretary Geithner appeared on various television programs to explain the 
Obama Administration’s position supporting the extension of the “McConnell provision” to deal 
with the debt ceiling. See Face the Nation (CBS television broadcast Dec. 2, 2012), transcript 
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3460_162-57556677/face-the-nation-transcripts-
december-2-2012-geithner-sens-graham-feinstein-rep-rogers/; Meet the Press (NBC television 
broadcast Dec. 2, 2012), transcript available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/50045823/ns/meet_the_press-transcripts/t/december-tim-geithner-
bob-corker-claire-mccaskill-grover-norquist-chris-van-hollen-jim-cramer-maria-
bartiromo/#.UM4tanPjkZg.  
8. 158 Cong. Rec. S7645 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2012) (statement of Sen. Mitch McConnell). 
9. Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 4, at 1197 (explaining that in such circumstances the 
president “faces a ‘trilemma’:  a choice between three bad options, all of which are 
unconstitutional”). 
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Our analysis showed that the president’s choice must be to honor 
Congress’s wishes regarding spending and taxes by setting aside its purported 
limitation on gross national debt.10 In order to execute the budget (which is 
composed of the taxing and spending laws) as enacted by Congress, the 
president would obviously not require (or seek) unlimited authority to borrow, 
as Senator McConnell claimed. Instead, he would simply issue enough new 
Treasury obligations to finance the amount of borrowing that Congress’s 
budget necessitates. Although the president could instead choose to act 
unconstitutionally by violating the spending law or the taxing law (that is, by 
spending less, or taxing more, than Congress had ordered him to do), and thus 
keep the debt level below the statutory limit, he would be wrong to do so. 
The reasons that we articulated in How to Choose remain true today. 
Congress retains the power to return the national debt to whatever level it sees 
fit, by passing budgets in the future that would result in annual surpluses 
sufficient to pay down the debt, to reach any congressionally desired target. 
Moreover, the president’s decision to issue debt in order to execute the 
congressionally mandated spending and taxing levels would do the least 
constitutional damage—that is, it would involve the smallest possible exercise 
of presidential discretion over judgments committed by the Constitution to 
Congress—because doing so would not give the president the ability to 
rebalance the spending and taxing priorities that are at the core of Congress’s 
budgeting process.11 A president who chose to set aside the debt ceiling in 
such a situation would, therefore, be exercising unconstitutional powers in the 
most restrained manner possible—under the impossible circumstances that 
Congress would have imposed upon him. 
In early December of 2012, Republican leaders announced that they 
would follow through on their earlier threats to try to force the President to 
choose between defaulting on the government’s legal obligations and 
exceeding the debt ceiling.12 Questions again arose in public discussion about 
whether the President would use one of the constitutional arguments available 
to him to void the debt ceiling. One of those arguments, which we also 
endorsed in How to Choose, was based on Section 4 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which forbids actions that would cause “[t]he validity of the 
public debt of the United States” to be “questioned.” If Congress would not 
increase the debt ceiling, making it possible for the federal government to 
 
10. See id. at 1215 (concluding that “the president would minimize his assumption of power 
by issuing debt rather than rebalancing taxing and spending choices”). 
11. See id at 1214–15 (discussing “costs of allowing a president to violate the balance of 
Congress’s priorities in taxing and spending” including “usurp[ing] legislative power”). 
12. See Russell Berman, Debt Ceiling Complicates Deficit Talks, The Hill (Dec. 5, 2012, 
7:59 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/271347-debt-limit-complicates-deficit-
talks (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing growing “threats on an increase in the 
debt ceiling”); Richard Rubin, Republicans Reprise 2011 Debt-Limit Threat in Cliff Talks, 
Bloomberg (Dec. 3, 2012, 5:57 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-03/republicans-
reprise-2011-debt-limit-threat-in-cliff-talks.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(reporting Republican leadership’s attempts to “replicat[e] the 2011 showdown that caused the 
U.S. to come within days of default”). 
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honor its debts, this provision would be violated.13 
In response to questions about the President’s possible plans to invoke 
this argument, the White House Press Secretary announced: “[T]his 
administration does not believe that the 14th Amendment gives the president 
the power to ignore the debt ceiling—period.”14 Notably, however, this 
statement did not address, or even acknowledge, that the President would face 
a trilemma. That is, even setting aside the language from Section 4, the 
President would still violate the Constitution no matter what choice he made. 
Yet the White House has said nothing to date about why it would try to resolve 
the constitutional crisis by cutting spending, rather than raising taxes or issuing 
additional debt. 
At most, the President’s spokesman could reasonably have been saying 
that the Administration does not think that the proper reading of the Fourteenth 
Amendment authorizes a president to issue debt in excess of the current dollar 
value of the debt ceiling. The White House is correct that the 
unconstitutionality of the debt ceiling does not itself empower the president to 
borrow money without congressional authorization. Whenever it passes a 
budget that is expected to result in an annual deficit, however, Congress 
authorizes the president to borrow the necessary funds to cover that shortfall. If 
the debt ceiling makes it impossible to do so, and if (as we argue) that makes 
the debt ceiling itself unconstitutional, then the president would not be 
arrogating to himself the authority to borrow money. Instead, he would simply 
be borrowing money that Congress has already authorized him to borrow. Such 
borrowing would clearly be constitutionally valid if the debt ceiling is 
unconstitutional because of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under the trilemma, 
the additional borrowing would be constitutionally invalid, but because it 
would be less unconstitutional than the other options, issuing additional debt 
would be the required choice. 
This issue is increasingly urgent. Currently, the federal government is not 
operating on a standard, fiscal-year-long budget. When the 2012 fiscal year 
ended on September 30, 2012, Congress enacted a continuing resolution, valid 
through March 27, 2013 (if not superseded prior to that date), that required the 
President to spend and tax in amounts that guaranteed that the debt ceiling 
would be reached at the end of 2012.15 Even if the Treasury Department again 
employs extraordinary accounting measures to extend the period before the 
debt ceiling would become unavoidably binding, the day of reckoning is now 
expected to be reached in early February 2013—before the current budget law 
 
13. Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 4, at 1194 (after acknowledging the possibility of 
reasonable disagreement, concluding that, “during an impasse of the sort that was narrowly 
avoided in August 2011, Section 4 would require the president to refuse to honor the debt ceiling 
if doing so would cause the government to fail to meet any of its financial obligations in a timely 
manner”). 
14. Press Briefing, White House Press Sec’y Jay Carney (Dec. 6, 2012, 11:58 AM), available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/12/06/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-
carney-12062012 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
15. Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-175, § 106, 126 Stat. 
1313, 1315 (2012). 
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has expired.16 
Accordingly, congressional refusal to increase the debt ceiling would, in 
fact, create the trilemma that we have described. If we are right that the debt 
ceiling itself is constitutionally defective, then the President would be legally 
required to borrow the money that Congress has already ordered him to 
borrow, in order to spend and tax in the amounts that it specified in its 
continuing budget resolution. 
Yet, as noted above, the White House has not at any time even described 
the legal choices that the President would face as constitutionally problematic. 
To be sure, the Administration has emphatically called upon Congress to 
increase the debt ceiling as a matter of course (not subject to any political 
“price”), but it has framed that argument entirely in policy and pragmatic 
terms. 
Having publicly ruled out the argument based on Section 4 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the White House has thus ignored the other (more 
fundamental) constitutional problem and merely taken the public stance that 
Congress should change its ways. Is it possible that the President and his 
advisors simply do not understand the elements of the trilemma? That seems 
unlikely.17 
III. WHAT THE WHITE HOUSE MIGHT BE THINKING, AND WHY IT WOULD 
BE WRONG IF IT IS 
To understand the reasoning that may be underwriting the Obama 
Administration’s refusal to entertain borrowing in excess of the debt ceiling, 
we begin with common ground. We agree with the Administration about this 
much: Even if failure to pay some category of government obligees would 
violate Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment, it does not automatically 
follow that the president may unilaterally issue debt in excess of the debt 
ceiling, for doing so could usurp congressional power to limit the scope of its 
delegation of borrowing authority, as Congress purported to do when it enacted 
the debt ceiling. If there were a practicable alternative method by which the 
government could meet its obligations without the president engaging in 
 
16. E.g., Steve Bell et al., Bipartisan Policy Ctr., Debt Limit Analysis 4–5 (2012).  
17. The President and his staff may not carefully read every issue of the Columbia Law 
Review, but presumably they do peruse the New York Times. See Bruce Bartlett, The Debt Limit 
is the Real Fiscal Cliff, Economix Blog, N.Y. Times (Dec. 3, 2012, 6:00 AM), 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/03/the-debt-limit-is-the-real-fiscal-cliff/ (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review) (discussing Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 4). Perhaps the 
Administration understands that the President would face a trilemma if Congress fails to raise the 
debt ceiling but takes the view that when faced with only unconstitutional options, a president 
may choose whichever option he pleases, free of constitutional constraint. See Brad DeLong, 
Debt Ceiling:  Mark Tushnet Says:  “Bruce Bartlett is No True Scotsman” (July 1, 2011, 11:34 
AM), http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2011/07/debt-ceiling-mark-tushnet-says-bruce-bartlett-is-no-
true-scotsman.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that by giving President 
Obama inconsistent commands “Congress has punted what to do to the Treasury”). If so, we 
would welcome acknowledgment of the true nature of the problem, even as we would disagree 
with the conclusion. See Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 4, at 1218 (rejecting suggestion that 
obligation to choose among unconstitutional options means “all bets are off”). 
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unauthorized borrowing, he would be constitutionally bound to follow that 
course. 
Perhaps the Administration has ruled out ignoring the debt ceiling 
because it has concluded that there are in fact practicable constitutional 
options. As we noted in How to Choose, one proposed method for doing so 
would be to mint two one-trillion-dollar platinum coins,18 because there is no 
statutory limit on the value of such coins that the government may mint.19 We 
dismissed this “jumbo coins” proposal as “cartoonish and desperate,”20 but 
maybe the Administration has concluded that desperate times demand 
desperate measures. 
Yet even Professor Jack Balkin, who first seriously publicized the jumbo 
coins proposal on his blog in 2011,21 no longer advocates it.22 Further, the 
statutory provision that permits the Treasury to mint platinum coins was 
enacted as part of a law that clearly manifested Congress’s intent to authorize 
the coining of commemorative coins,23 notwithstanding the fact that, as 
codified, the current authorization states no such limit.24 
Thus, all things considered, we doubt that the Administration has ruled 
out borrowing in excess of the debt ceiling on the ground that, if push comes to 
shove, it plans to mint jumbo coins. At least absent some official public 
statement endorsing the jumbo coin option, we believe that serious 
commentators would be wise to disregard it. 
We take a similarly dim view of the possibility that the Administration is 
contemplating other “outside-of-the-box” options, like auctioning off federal 
lands or selling corporate naming rights to national monuments. Again, if such 
a bizarre contingency plan existed, one would expect some indication of it 
 
18. See Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 4, at 1180 (discussing Professor Jack Balkin’s jumbo 
coins proposal). 
19. See 31 U.S.C. § 5112(k) (2006) (“The Secretary may mint and issue platinum bullion 
coins and proof platinum coins in accordance with such specifications, designs, varieties, 
quantities, denominations, and inscriptions as the Secretary, in the Secretary’s discretion, may 
prescribe from time to time.”). 
20. Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 4, at 1231. 
21. See Jack M. Balkin, 3 Ways Obama Could Bypass Congress, CNN (July 28, 2011),  
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-07-28/opinion/balkin.obama.options_1_debt-ceilingcongress-coins 
[hereinafter Balkin, Ways to Bypass] (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (suggesting 
Treasury circumvent statutory limit on currency notes by issuing two trillion dollar coins). 
22. See Brad Plumer, Could Two Platinum Coins Solve the Debt-Ceiling Crisis?, 
Wonkblog, Wash. Post (Dec. 7, 2012, 12:37 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/12/07/could-two-platinum-coins-
solve-the-debt-ceiling-crisis/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (stating “even Balkin now 
says that he thinks the platinum-coin option is too risky”). 
23. See id. (citing H.R. 2614, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-104hr2614rfs/pdf/BILLS-104hr2614rfs.pdf) (“Opponents 
could plausibly argue that the original law was intended to set rules around commemorative 
coins, not to finance the operations of the government.”); see also James Hamilton, Trillion 
Dollar Platinum Coin, Econbrowser (Dec. 8, 2012, 7:19 AM), 
http://www.econbrowser.com/archives/2012/12/trillion_dollar.html (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (characterizing platinum-coin-minting-authorization as “legislation originally 
intended to satisfy a small group of numismatists”).  
24. See supra note 19 (quoting statutory language). 
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from the Administration.25 
In any event, it is no mystery what the Administration plans to do in the 
event that inaction on the debt ceiling leaves the government with insufficient 
borrowing authority to meet its legal obligations. As in 2011, so in 2013, the 
Administration apparently plans to spend less money than Congress 
authorized.26 The mystery is how the executive could undertake such cuts 
within the bounds of the Constitution. 
The Administration may take a narrow view of what constitutes an action 
that violates Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment on the ground that it 
causes the validity of the public debt to be questioned: Perhaps the 
Administration thinks that only failure to pay bondholders, or more narrowly 
still, only failure to pay the principal on bonds, would violate Section 4. Let us 
grant that assumption for the sake of argument. As we were at pains to show in 
How to Choose, and as we have explained again here, even if failure to spend 
some substantial portion of appropriated funds would not violate Section 4 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, it would violate the separation of powers.27 
So far as we have been able to ascertain, neither the Administration nor 
the academic critics of setting aside the debt ceiling have even attempted to 
explain whence the president derives the authority to spend less money than 
Congress has required him to spend. Accordingly, we will make the effort on 
their behalf. We think the best argument that might be given in support of 
unilateral presidential authority to slash spending rather than to issue debt in 
excess of the debt ceiling would go like this: 
The president’s failure to spend sums Congress has appropriated would 
indeed be unlawful. It would violate both the current appropriations laws and 
 
25. Moreover, even if there might be reasonable disagreement about our conclusion that 
failing to pay all federal budgetary obligations in full would violate the constitutional prohibition 
of bringing into question the validity of the public debt, we think there would be consensus that 
the issuance of jumbo coins (or any other similarly desperate measure to raise money) violates 
Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Surely, anything that makes the public reasonably 
wonder whether the federal government is scraping the bottom of the barrel for ideas on how to 
raise money, rather than simply raising the debt ceiling, would cast doubt not just on the validity 
of the debt, but on the future of our financial system—and of the political system as well. See 
Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 4, at 1231 (noting jumbo coins option could itself violate Section 4, 
since “the very act of minting trillion-dollar coins . . . could undermine faith in the government’s 
ability to repay its obligations”). 
26. See Interview by Scott Pelley with President Barack Obama, CBS Evening News (CBS 
television broadcast July 12, 2011) (describing how debt ceiling may threaten payment of 
entitlement benefits); Press Briefing, White House Press Sec’y Jay Carney (July 12, 2011), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/07/12/press-briefing-press-
secretary-jay-carney-7122011 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing decision of 
which spending cuts to implement as a “kind of Sophie’s Choice situation”); see also Press 
Briefing, White House Press Sec’y Jay Carney (Dec. 5, 2012), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/12/05/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-
carney-and-nec-prinicipal-deputy-dire (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing same 
issue and confirming Administration’s refusal to unilaterally raise debt ceiling). 
27. See Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 4, at 1196–1202 (discussing “trilemma” that arises 
from fact that president cannot faithfully execute all laws enacted by Congress, including 
appropriations). 
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the Impoundment Control Act of 1974.28 However, if faced with the choice of 
acting unconstitutionally by unilaterally raising the debt ceiling (or raising 
taxes) or acting in violation of mere statutes, the president has a duty to 
respect the constitutional limit and violate the statutes. Under such 
circumstances, the statutory obligations to spend budgeted amounts are 
themselves unconstitutional, because obeisance to them would entail violating 
the (constitutionally protected) debt ceiling. 
Is that a persuasive argument? We think it would be persuasive if the 
premise were correct: If a president’s decision to spend less than the amount 
Congress authorized were merely a statutory violation—and if presidential 
borrowing in excess of the debt ceiling were not merely a statutory violation—
then yes, the obligation to spend all of the money would have to give way to a 
constitutional obligation not to borrow or tax without congressional 
authorization. If it is impossible to comply with both the Constitution and a 
statute, the duty to comply with the Constitution prevails over the duty to 
comply with the statute, at least absent the sort of catastrophic harm that might 
be thought to justify unconstitutional action.29 
But is the premise true? Would a president’s failure to spend money that 
Congress has clearly required him to spend amount to a mere statutory 
violation, or is it also a violation of the president’s obligation to take care that 
the laws are faithfully executed? And if it is merely statutory, how is it any 
different from the debt ceiling, which is itself a statute? 
Proponents of presidential spending cuts might attempt to draw an 
act/omission distinction between, on the one hand, a president’s unilateral 
borrowing, taxing, or spending, and, on the other hand, a president’s unilateral 
decision not to borrow, tax, or spend in accordance with an act of Congress. 
Presidential borrowing, taxing, or spending beyond what Congress has 
authorized, usurps Article I power. However, in this view, a president’s 
unilateral failure to spend (or borrow or tax) in the full amount authorized by 
Congress does not amount to the exercise of an Article I power; it simply fails 
to fully carry out the delegated authority, and therefore violates the relevant 
statutes, but not the Constitution. 
We are highly dubious about the utility of the act/omission distinction in 
this context. Should a president’s decision to cancel a tax deduction or tax 
credit be characterized as an affirmative act of taxation—and thus be deemed 
unconstitutional—or as a mere omission that fails to fully implement 
Congress’s will—and thus be deemed “only” a statutory violation? Under the 
circumstances, the label of “act” or “omission” is a conclusion, not a fact in the 
world. 
In any event, even if we had greater faith in this approach as a matter of 
first principle, case law pretty clearly establishes that a president’s failure to 
spend funds that Congress has required him to spend is a constitutional 
 
28. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C. §§ 681– 688 
(2006). 
29. See Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 4, at 1230–31. 
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violation. The key decisions are Train v. City of New York30 and Clinton v. 
City of New York.31 
In Train, the Court unanimously held that a statutory delegation to the 
president of the authority to spend money on addressing water pollution was a 
requirement that the president spend all of the appropriated funds.32 Taken 
alone, of course, Train does no more than establish that Congress can, if it so 
specifies, require that the president spend money; it does not say that the 
obligation is a constitutional one. 
But even taken alone, Train’s logic appears rooted in separation of 
powers. The unanimous Court in Train set the case in context by noting that 
before President Nixon attempted to impound the funds Congress appropriated 
for addressing water pollution, he vetoed the underlying bill.33 Why was that 
fact relevant to the case? It does not bear directly on the question of whether 
Congress intended to vest discretion in the president to spend less than the 
allocated funds. But it does bear on a constitutional issue: If, in the absence of 
a delegation of discretionary spending authority from Congress, a president 
could nonetheless choose not to spend money that Congress had appropriated, 
then he would be able to give himself what amounts to a non-overridable veto 
power, in contravention of the lawmaking procedure set forth in Article I, 
Section 7. Put simply, whenever the president unilaterally decides not to spend 
money that Congress has directed that he spend, he acts in violation of Article 
I, Section 7 and his Article II, Section 3 obligation to take care that the laws 
are faithfully executed. 
Clinton v. City of New York confirms this reading of the obligation to 
spend as a constitutional obligation. In Clinton, the majority and dissent 
disagreed over the question of whether Congress, in enacting the Line Item 
Veto Act, had impermissibly granted the president a line-item veto, in 
contravention of the all-or-nothing veto power of Article I, Section 7—as the 
majority concluded34—or had merely delegated to the president the power to 
treat various expenditures as setting maximum spending levels rather than 
specifying exact sums—as the dissent contended.35 The majority thought that 
the Line Item Veto Act impermissibly empowered the president to “repeal” 
duly enacted laws, in violation of Article I, Section 7.36 Because the dissenters 
took a less formalistic view of the Act, they did not think it granted repeal 
authority, but only because the president acted pursuant to what they regarded 
as a valid delegation of spending discretion. Even the Clinton dissenters did 
not suggest that the president has any inherent authority to really repeal acts of 
Congress. More importantly for present purposes, the entire framing of the 
question in Clinton makes clear that a president’s assertion of authority to 
 
30. 420 U.S. 35 (1975). 
31. 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
32. Train, 420 U.S. at 41. 
33. See id. at 40. 
34. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 438–47. 
35. See id. at 463–69 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 473–80 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
36. Id. at 438 (opinion of the Court) (“In both legal and practical effect, the President has 
amended two Acts of Congress by repealing a portion of each.”). 
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decline to spend money appropriated by Congress raises a constitutional 
question under Article I, Section 7, not just a statutory question. Every justice 
who decided Clinton took for granted that the Constitution would forbid a 
president from canceling funding Congress had required him to spend in the 
absence of a valid delegation of funding-canceling authority.37 
And that makes good sense. In giving the power of the purse to Congress, 
rather than the president, the Framers no doubt meant to guard against the sorts 
of abuses perpetrated by the Stuart kings, who repeatedly battled parliament 
over appropriations.38 But that is not the only sort of abuse against which the 
assignment of the purse power to Congress guards. Libertarians may worry 
only about presidents attempting to spend money that Congress has not 
authorized. But our Constitution assumes (quite correctly, in our view) that 
threats to the public welfare and safety may sometimes arise from a decision to 
spend too little on a pressing public need (by, for example, refusing to spend 
money to save life and limb during a natural disaster, or to invest adequately in 
the education of the nation’s children). A president who impounds funds in the 
teeth of a congressional judgment that some government program must be 
funded thereby usurps legislative power. 
It might nonetheless be objected that our argument proves too much. If a 
president’s refusal to spend money appropriated by Congress is 
unconstitutional, does that mean that every less-than-total enforcement of 
federal law by the executive also violates the Constitution? What about the 
Obama Administration’s forbearance (thus far) from enforcing the federal 
Controlled Substances Act39 with respect to possession of small quantities of 
marijuana for medical purposes in states where such possession is legal?40 Or 
the Administration’s decision to offer the chance to stay in the United States to 
some non-citizens who came to this country as children?41 Do these policies 
violate Article I, Section 7 and/or the Take Care Clause because they 
implement the relevant federal statutes only partially? 
We offer nothing like a full view on these questions here. We will say that 
we find deeply troubling any suggestion that the president can simply choose 
 
37. In dissent, Justice Scalia cited historical instances of presidents asserting a constitutional 
right to cancel funding even absent a congressional grant of such discretion, but then cited Train 
for the proposition that they were wrong. See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 467–68 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
38. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 58 (James Madison) (observing that under Constitution, 
members of Congress “hold the purse[,] that powerful instrument by which we behold, in the 
history of the British Constitution, an infant and humble representation of the people gradually 
enlarging the sphere of its activity and importance, and finally reducing, as far as it seems to have 
wished, all the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the government.”) 
39. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2006).  
40. Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney Gen. to U.S. Attorneys, on 
Investigations and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana (Oct. 19, 
2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/medical-marijuana.pdf (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review).  
41. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Sec. to David V. Aguilar, 
Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs and Border Prot., on Exercing Prosecutorial Discretion with 
Respect to Individuals Who Came to the U.S. as Children (June 15, 2012), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-
to-us-as-children.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
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not to enforce some law on the ground that he disagrees with the policy 
underlying that law. At a minimum, we would expect the president to offer 
some justification for not enforcing a law.42 With respect to marijuana 
possession and deferred action on unlawful immigration, the Obama 
Administration has invoked the traditional prosecutorial discretion that the 
executive branch enjoys in such matters.43 Perhaps that argument is 
persuasive; perhaps it is not. In any event, it is quite a different argument from 
the one we are now considering with respect to federal spending. Thus, one 
could conclude—as we do—that the president lacks the constitutional authority 
to make unilateral spending cuts in the event that Congress fails to raise the 
debt ceiling, without committing oneself to any particular view about the 
constitutionality or wisdom of the Obama Administration’s policies with 
respect to medical marijuana and immigration. 
We have considered and found wanting each of the most plausible 
explanations for the Obama Administration’s apparent conclusion that, in the 
event that Congress fails to raise the debt ceiling, it will have to make 
unilateral spending cuts. There is, however, one explanation that we would 
applaud: Perhaps the Administration believes that under such circumstances, 
unilateral spending cuts would be unconstitutional, but less unconstitutional 
than exceeding the debt ceiling. For the reasons we set forth in How to Choose, 
we would disagree with the conclusion; in our judgment, exceeding the debt 
ceiling is the least unconstitutional option.44 Nonetheless, at least the contrary 
conclusion that cutting spending would be less unconstitutional is the right 
kind of judgment. 
Unfortunately, none of the Obama Administration’s public statements to 
date indicate that the President or his advisors regard the choice that the 
president would face in the event that Congress fails to raise the debt ceiling as 
a choice among unconstitutional options. Until they understand the nature of 
the problem, we cannot expect them to offer a well-reasoned response to it. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this essay, we have treated the Obama Administration’s statements 
regarding the debt ceiling as expressing sincere views about the law, but it may 
be possible to read them instead as tactical moves in the budget negotiations 
with congressional Republicans. As we have explained, the President’s 
contingency plan of unilateral spending cuts would in fact usurp more power 
from Congress than would unilaterally issuing debt. Perhaps the President has 
ruled out the least unconstitutional option for the very reason that doing so is 
 
42. Cf. Statement of the Attorney General on Litigation Involving the Defense of Marriage 
Act (Feb. 23, 2011) (explaining Administration’s reasons for its decision no longer to defend 
constitutionality of Section 3 of Defense of Marriage Act), available at 
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-222.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
43. Id.; Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen. to U.S. Attorneys, on 
Guidance Regarding the Ogden Memo in Jurisdictions Seeking to Authorize Marijuana for 
Medical Use (June 29, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/docs/dag-guidance-2011-
for-medical-marijuana-use.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
44. Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 4, at 1215–17. 
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most likely to frighten Republicans into making concessions at the bargaining 
table. After all, a unilateral presidential decision to cut spending on various 
projects, at his sole discretion, should be utterly unacceptable to his political 
opponents. Congressional Republicans should, in that light, wish to limit the 
President’s power in exactly the way that we have described here. They could 
so limit him by actually passing an increase in the debt ceiling, however. 
In a sense, learning that the Administration has been prevaricating would 
be welcome news, for it would show that the President properly understands 
that congressional failure to raise the debt ceiling would place him in the 
trilemma we have described. Nonetheless, we regard this possibility as remote 
for two reasons. 
First, the politics suggest otherwise. Although Congress as an institution 
would lose the most were the president to make unilateral spending cuts, in the 
current political climate, Republicans have made it clear that they favor 
spending cuts over additional borrowing on ideological grounds, either because 
they have not considered the power that this would bestow upon the President, 
or because they believe that he would not use that power in ways that they 
would find unacceptable. Thus, taking congressionally unauthorized borrowing 
off of the table makes little sense as a tactic designed to pressure congressional 
Republicans. 
Second, we hesitate to ascribe Machiavellian motives to the Administration. By all 
indications, President Obama and his advisors sincerely believe that if Congress 
fails to raise the debt ceiling, they will have no choice but to cut spending. We 
think that they are wrong. In any case, they have to date not articulated persuasive 
reasons for their belief. 
 
 
 
Preferred Citation: Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, Nullifying the Debt 
Ceiling Threat Once and for All: Why the President Should Embrace the Least 
Constitutional Option, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 237 (2012), 
http://www.columbialawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/12/237_Buchanan_Dorf.pdf 
 
